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FAIR.COM?:  
AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF SYSTEMIC 
UNFAIRNESS IN THE ICANN UDRP† 
Michael Geist* 
“There should be a general parity between the appeal rights of 
complainants and domain name holders.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In just over two years, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers’ (“ICANN”) Uniform Domain Name Dis-
pute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”)2 has resolved over 4000 dis-
putes involving almost 8000 domain names.3  With its global 
reach, fast turnaround and inexpensive fees, the UDRP is 
touted as a shining example of the potential of online alterna-
  
 † The author publicly released a working draft of this Article under the 
same title in August 2001.  This final version adds to the previous draft with 
updated statistical data and conclusions. 
 * Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.  Director of 
E-commerce Law, Goodmans LLP. The author would like to thank University 
of Ottawa, Faculty of Law students Hafeez Rupani, Anna Russell, Teresa 
David, Will Karam and Paul Lewandowski for their research assistance; sev-
eral reviewers, who for obvious reasons will remain anonymous, for their 
comments during the research phase of this study; the staff of the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law and Rene Geist for their editorial assistance; 
and Allison Geffen for her continuing love and support.  Any errors or omis-
sions remain the sole responsibility of the author.  The author can be con-
tacted at mgeist@uottawa.ca. 
 1. ICANN, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Min-
utes of Meeting, Board Resolution 99.83, at 
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-26august99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999). 
 2. ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), 
at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN 
POLICY]. 
 3. ICANN reports that as of April 11, 2002, there were 4550 case disposi-
tions involving 7879 domain names.  The total number of proceedings 
equaled 4936 cases involving 8495 domain names. ICANN, Statistical Sum-
mary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
as of Apr. 11, 2002, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
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tive dispute resolution with supporters suggesting that it can 
be used as a model for other e -commerce legal disputes.4 
Despite its substantial caseload and some positive reviews, 
the UDRP also has its share of critics.  There are some who 
suggest that the system does not go far enough to protect 
trademark holders.5   The South African government, for ex-
ample, has argued that the policy should better protect country 
names and has urged the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (“WIPO”) to formulate amendments that might be incor-
porated into a revised version of the UDRP.6  WIPO, in fact, 
recently concluded a public consultation on a series of potential 
amendments that considered expanding the scope of the UDRP 
to explicitly include personal names, geographic designations 
and trade names.7 
  
 4. For example, Masanobu Katoh, Chairman of the Internet Law & Pol-
icy Forum (“ILPF”) and an ICANN board member, remarked at an ILPF con-
ference in September 2000 that: 
 
I have extensive experience with both Japanese and the U.S. court 
systems, as well as Alternative Dispute Resolution Proceedings.  
Never, and I mean never, have I seen a dispute resolution mecha-
nism work so well.  In less than a year, over 1,000 arbitrations have 
been initiated under the UDRP. 
In more than two thirds of those cases, there already have been a 
disposition.  These cases have been handled quickly, inexpensively, 
and most important of all, fairly.  Without question, the UDRP is an 
important model for Dispute Resolution in other e-Commerce areas. 
INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM , INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM 2000 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 19 (2000), at http://www.ilpf.org/events/jurisdic-
tion2/conf00d1.pdf. 
 5. Some critics have bemoaned the absence of a discovery process and the 
increasing sophistication of cybersquatters.  See Mitchell J. Matorin & M. 
Boudett, Domain Name Disputes: Cases Illustrate Limitations of ICANN Pol-
icy, 45 BOSTON B.J. 4 (2001).  Others have lamented complainants’ inability 
to obtain damages.  See M.E. Searing, What’s in a Domain Name? A Critical 
Analysis of the National and International Impact on Domain Name Cyber-
squatting, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 110 (2000).   
 6. See REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA , SUBMISSION BY REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA IN RESPONSE TO WIPO2  RFC-2, available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/ 
process2/rfc/rfc2-comments/2000/msg00059/wipo2-submission.doc (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002). 
 7. See WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE 
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (2001), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/proc-
ess2/rfc/rfc3/pdf/report.pdf. 
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Another vocal group of UDRP critics has also emerged, con-
cerned that the system promotes forum shopping and is sys-
temically biased in favor of trademark holders, who are in-
variably the complainants in domain name disputes.8  These 
concerns, which were expressed during the initial drafting of 
the UDRP,9 have grown louder as the policy has been put into 
practice and data begins to emerge.10   
The right of complainants to pick which arbitration provider 
handles their dispute has been the target of particularly vocif-
erous criticism.11  Although ICANN initially accredited three 
arbitration providers in order to foster a competitive environ-
ment, many commentators anticipated that complainants 
would engage in forum shopping by rationally selecting arbi-
tration providers who tended to rule in their favor.  Those fears 
were realized almost immediately.   The two ICANN-accredited 
  
 8. See MILTON MUELLER, DIGITAL CONVERGENCE CTR., ROUGH JUSTICE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ICANN’S UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (2000), at 
http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm; Michael Geist, WIPO Wipes Out Domain 
Name Rights, GLOBETECHNOLOGY.COM (Aug. 24, 2000), at 
http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/GAMArticleHTMLTemplate?tf=globe
technology/TGAM/EBusinessFullStory.html&cf=globetechnology/tech-config-
neutral&slug=TWGEIS&date=20000824.  
 9. See A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on WIPO’s “The Manage-
ment of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues,”  at 
http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/commentary.htm (May 19, 1999); A. Mi-
chael Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Policy, at 
http://personal.law.miami.edu/~amf/icann-udp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999).  
 10. See Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrota, Exploring Legal Boundaries 
Within Cyberspace: What Law Controls in a Global Marketplace?, 21 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 523, 558 (2000) (“[T]he bias toward trademark owners may 
have far-reaching and unsettling repercussions.”); A. Michael Froomkin & 
David Post, Froomkin and Post Send Letter to ICANN Board,  at 
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/post_froomkin_udrp_letter.htm (Jan. 26, 
2000).  Froomkin and Post state:  
 
Complainant choice has the useful property of promoting price com-
petition.  Unfortunately, economic theory suggests that it also will 
tend to promote other types of competition, including competition 
among dispute resolution service providers to be perceived as being 
most “complainant-friendly” in order to capture all, or a dispropor-
tionate share, of the market.  We consider this to be a very serious 
issue, as even the appearance of partiality would so taint the UDRP 
as to call the entire enterprise into question. 
Id. 
 11. See Froomkin & Post, supra note 10. 
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providers with the most favorable outcomes for complainants 
(WIPO and the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)) quickly 
captured the lion’s share of the caseload at the expense of 
eResolution, the least complainant-friendly of the major 
ICANN-accredited providers.12  Furthermore, forum shopping 
has continued to increase over time.  In February 2001, for ex-
ample, only three new cases were launched with eResolution, 
compared with 268 cases with WIPO and 143 cases with the 
NAF.13  Faced with an ever-shrinking caseload, eResolution 
shut down its operations in December 2001.14   
Although the existence of forum shopping has become com-
mon knowledge among those involved with the UDRP, a criti-
cal question remains unanswered.  While there is clearly an 
incentive for arbitration providers to curry favor with potential 
complainants in order to attract future cases, how, if at all, do 
they do so?  The more obvious sources of provider differentia-
tion have only occurred on a fairly small scale.  For example, 
price competition, one clear method of distinguishing providers, 
has thus far been rather limited.  Among the three main pro-
viders,15 the cost for a single domain, single panelist case starts 
  
 12. See MUELLER, supra note 8. Louis Touton, ICANN’s general counsel 
has also expressed concern over forum shopping, noting that: “Forum shop-
ping is clearly a problem and if it is occurring it suggests that justice is being 
bought and sold.”  Oscar S. Cisneros, What to Do with Domain Disputes?, 
WIRED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/ 
0,1294,39992,00.html. 
 13. ICANN, List of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
 14. See Steven Bonisteel, Arbitration Firm Quits Domain-Dispute Busi-
ness, NEWSBYTES (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.newsbytes.com/ 
news/01/172619.html. 
 15. The Center for Public Resources (“CPR”) Institute for Dispute Resolu-
tion, which received accreditation as an ICANN dispute resolution provider 
in May 2000, has thus far been a non-factor in the UDRP.  As of February 18, 
2002, the provider had only been involved in a total of thirty-one cases.  See 
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002). Given the small number, the CPR data is excluded from most 
analysis in this Article.  A fifth provider, the Asian Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Centre, was approved as an ICANN accredited provider effective 
February 28, 2002.  It had rendered no decisions as of the date data was col-
lected for this study.  Id.  
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from a low of $950 (NAF) to a high of $1500 (WIPO).16  When 
the legal costs associated with a UDRP action are factored into 
the equation, the difference in filing fees is relatively unimpor-
tant. 
Other differences, such as panelist rosters and language ca-
pabilities are even less pronounced.  Although initially there 
were considerable differences in panelist roster composition, 
prior to eResolution ceasing operations, the rosters of the three 
providers looked increasingly alike.  WIPO’s roster was once 
characterized primarily as being comprised of a global group of 
trademark attorneys and law professors,17 while the NAF’s ros-
ter was described as retired American judges,18 and eResolu-
tion’s roster was perceived as international law professors.19  
With a growing number of panelists cross-listed with multiple 
providers, it is now more difficult to distinguish between pro-
vider panelist rosters.20  Moreover, the NAF and eResolution 
have increased the international component of their panelist 
rosters, narrowing the gap with WIPO and improving their 
ability to address cases in foreign languages and with non-U.S. 
parties. 
Marketing techniques clearly illustrate one area of differen-
tiation between providers, with the NAF adopting a far more 
aggressive approach than the other providers in the marketing 
of its services.  Unlike both WIPO and eResolution, the NAF 
regularly distributed press releases heralding recent decisions.  
The releases took on a distinctly pro-complainant tone in the 
  
 16. Three-member panel, single domain cases are even closer in cost.  Fees 
start at a low of $2500 with the NAF and increase to a high of $3000 with 
WIPO.  See WIPO, Schedule of Fees Under the ICANN Policy , at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); 
National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure, Appendix C: Fee Schedule, at 
http://www.arb-forum.com/arbitration/NAF/Code_linked/apdx_c.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2002); ERESOLUTION , ERESOLUTION SUPPLEMENTAL RULES ¶19 
(1999), available at http://www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/p_r/supprules. 
htm [hereinafter ERESOLUTION RULES]. 
 17. See Stacey H. King, The “Law That It Deems Applicable”: ICANN, 
Dispute Resolution, and the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 453, 477 (2000). 
 18. See Tamara Loomis, Domain Name Disputes Get Swift Resolution 
Under UDRP, 224 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2000). 
 19. See King, supra note 17, at 479. 
 20. For a complete list of cross-listed panelists as of July 31, 2001, see 
Annex A. 
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months prior to the August 2001 public release of a draft of this 
study.21  The author, who is on the NAF’s media distribution 
list, received eleven press releases from May through August 
2001, ten of which promoted a complainant win.  Featuring 
headlines such as Arbitrator Delivers Internet Order for 
Fingerhut22 and May the Registrant of magiceightball.com Keep 
the Domain . . . Not Likely,23 the releases do little to engender 
confidence in the neutrality of the NAF.24 
The providers’ supplemental rules also provide a point of dif-
ference.  For example, each provider takes a slightly different 
approach to respondents’ response rights.  WIPO does not pro-
vide any supplemental rules on responses.  It relies instead on 
the ICANN Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy (“ICANN Rules”), which outline that responses must 
be filed within twenty days25 and that extensions may be 
granted either in exceptional cases or if the parties mutually 
agree to an extension.26 eResolution similarly relied on the 
ICANN Rules for respondent submissions, but included an ad-
  
 21. The release of a working draft of this study generated considerable 
interest among those involved in the ICANN UDRP process as well as with 
the media.  See Julia Angwin, Are Domian Panels the Hanging Judges of 
Cyberspace Court?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2001, at B1; Steven Bonisteel, Law 
Expert Charges Bias in Domain-Dispute Arbitrations, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 20, 
2001, 2001 WL 23417533; Patrick Brethour, Web Arbitration Biased: Study, 
GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 20, 2001, at B4; Domain Disputes Don’t Get Fair Hear-
ing Says Study, DOW JONES REUTERS BUS., Aug. 21, 2001, 2001 WL 17928390; 
Gwendolyn Mariano, Web Address Disputes Deemed Unfair, CNET NEWS.COM  
(Dec. 4, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276607.html?legacy=cnet; 
Joe Salkowski, Big Guys Usually Win Best Addresses, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 
2001, at 5.  
 22. Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Arbitrator Delivers Inter-
net Order for Fingerhut (May 4, 2001) (on file with Journal). 
 23. Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, May the Registrant of 
magiceightball.com Keep the Domain . . . Not Likely (Aug. 10, 2001) (on file 
with Journal). 
 24. See Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Kevin Spacey Prevails 
Against Usual Suspect in Domain Name Case (May 11, 2001) (on file with 
Journal); Press Release, National Arbitration Forum, Holder of Beatles Do-
main Names Must “Get Back” (June 8, 2001) (on file with Journal); Press 
Release, National Arbitration Forum, Skateboard Magazine Thrashes Span-
ish Double (June 21, 2001) (on file with Journal).   
 25. ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
POLICY § 5(a) (1999), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-
24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN RULES]. 
 26. Id. § 5(d). 
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ditional provision that granted a respondent five calendar days 
to correct any deficiencies in its submission once so notified by 
the provider.27  The NAF, meanwhile, contains the most de-
tailed and onerous requirements for an extension.  Restrictions 
Dispute Resolution for Domain Names (“RDRP”) Supplemental 
Rules (“NAF Supplemental Rules”) paragraph 6(a) states that: 
Paragraph 5(d) of the Rules provides that the Respondent 
may request additional time to submit a Response, or may be 
given additional time if the parties stipulate to an extension 
and the Forum approves. Any request by the Respondent for 
an extension or any joint request by the parties for an exten-
sion shall: 
(i) be submitted after the parties have first conferred with 
each other to see if they could reach an agreement concerning 
the requested extension; 
(ii) be submitted in writing to the Forum and the parties 
within the time for the Response to be submitted; 
(iii) state the exceptional circumstances warranting the re-
quest for an extension; 
(iv) state the length of the extension being requested (no 
more than twenty (20) additional days); and 
(v) be accompanied by an extension fee of $100. 28  
The NAF Supplemental Rules, which were added in May 
2000, clearly place an additional burden on a respondent seek-
ing an extension and has been characterized by some commen-
tators as “worrisome” and “extremely biased.”29  At a minimum, 
the NAF Supplemental Rules distinguish the NAF from its 
competitors. 
Since most of the differentiating factors are somewhat be-
nign, the most prominent difference between providers remains 
case outcome.  Simply put, complainants win more frequently 
with WIPO and the NAF than with eResolution.  The author 
conducted a statistical analysis of all ICANN UDRP decisions 
through February 18, 2002, the results of which are discussed 
  
 27. ERESOLUTION RULES ¶ (7)(c)(ii)(2).  
 28. NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM , RESTRICTIONS DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR 
DOMAIN NAMES (“RDRP”) SUPPLEMENTAL RULES § 6(a) (2002), available at 
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/RDRP/RDRP_supp_Rules.rtf  (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2002) [hereinafter NAF RULES]. 
 29. King, supra note 17, at 498. 
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throughout the Article.30  The statistical data, which has re-
mained consistent since the introduction of the UDRP, shows 
that complainants win 80.6% of the time with WIPO, 83.3% of 
the time with the NAF, but only 61.1% of the time with eReso-
lution.31  Since outcome is what matters most to complainants, 
they have rewarded WIPO and the NAF with an overwhelming 
share of the UDRP caseload.  Despite the highest fees, neutral 
rules and low-key marketing, WIPO commands 59.2% of the 
UDRP caseload, compared with 34.5% for the NAF and a paltry 
5.6% for eResolution.32  
With the statistical evidence leaving little doubt that forum 
shopping is part of the UDRP, this study takes the next step by 
determining whether bias may exist within the system and, if 
so, how it manifests itself.  With differences such as fees, mar-
keting and supplemental rules between providers transparent 
to all, the starting point for a deeper analysis into case out-
comes must be to focus on aspects of the UDRP that are not 
transparent.  The primary focus of this Article is therefore on 
panelist allocation. 
Although the ICANN Rules and provider supplemental rules 
indicate how panelists are selected,33 little is known about how 
providers determine precisely which panelists serve on what 
cases.  Panelist allocation has become particularly important as 
the providers’ panelist rosters have converged.  As noted above, 
each provider’s roster now features an impressive contingent of 
international panelists capable of addressing disputes between 
litigants in different languages and legal systems.  Moreover, a 
growing number of panelists are cross-listed — that is, they are 
featured on the roster of more than one provider.34  The multi-
  
 30. All UDRP statistical data has been compiled by the author and re-
flects all decisions released as of February 18, 2002.  As discussed above, the 
author released an earlier version of this study in August 2001 that covered 
all decisions as of July 7, 2001.  Unless otherwise noted, this Article cites to 
the more updated data.  See Michael Geist, UDRPinfo.com, at 
http://www.udrpinfo.com/bjil (last modified Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Geist-
Database]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See ICANN RULES § 6(b)-(e). 
 34. As of July 31, 2001, sixty-three panelists were listed on the roster of at 
least two providers.  See infra Annex A for a complete list of cross-listed pan-
elists. 
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provider phenomenon was particularly common with WIPO 
and eResolution, where despite markedly different case out-
comes, twenty-eight of the panelists were featured on both ros-
ters as of August 2001.35  
The existence of multi-provider panelists complicates the 
bias question considerably.  If each of the providers’ panel ros-
ters were distinctly different, differences in case outcomes 
could be attributed to the varying composition of provider pan-
els.  In such a scenario, one might expect differences in case 
outcomes since providers could staff their panelist rosters with 
the panelists most likely to deliver the desired outcomes.  Since 
many of the same panelists decide cases for multiple providers, 
however, it seems unlikely that the composition of a provider’s 
panelist roster alone would explain differences in case out-
comes.  Accordingly, if many of the same panelists are deciding 
cases for multiple providers, how is it that complainants win 
over 80% of the time with WIPO and NAF, and only 61% of the 
time with eResolution?   
Following a review of over 4000 cases, the answer becomes 
clear.  The critical issue does not rest with the roster of panel-
ists per se, but rather with how the roster is deployed.  Analy-
sis of all UDRP cases decided as of February 18, 2002 reveals 
several striking trends that provide new insight into how the 
UDRP decision-making process functions in practice.  The 
study finds that influence over panel composition is likely the 
most important controlling factor in determining case out-
comes.36  The data shows that when providers control who de-
cides a case, which they do for all single panel cases, complain-
ants win just over 83% of the time.37  When provider influence 
over panelists diminishes — which occurs in three-member 
panel cases, as in these cases both the complainant and re-
spondent choose one of the panelists as well as exercise some 
influence over the choice of the third member of the panel — 
  
 35. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 36. This should not be taken to suggest that the merits of the case are 
unimportant.  The strength of the bad faith claim and complainant rights in 
the domain are, of course, crucial.  The data suggests, however, that panelist 
allocation is a significant determinant of case outcome, particularly for those 
cases that are not clear-cut cases of cybersquatting or do not fall squarely 
within a strict interpretation of the UDRP.  
 37. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
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the complainant winning percentage drops to 60%.38  Moreover, 
this differential remains consistent when examining both un-
contested cases, frequently referred to as defaults, as well as 
contested cases.39  
In addition to the dramatic difference in outcome between 
single and three-member panels, the study finds that case allo-
cation appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a ma-
jority of cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panel-
ists.   Most troubling is data which suggests that, despite 
claims of impartial random case allocation as well as a large 
roster of 135 panelists,40 the majority of the NAF single panel 
cases are actually assigned to little more than a handful of 
panelists.41  As of February 18, 2002, an astonishing 56% of all 
NAF single panel cases — 778 of 1379 — were decided by only 
six people.42  The complainant winning percentage in those 
cases was an astounding 95%.43  Although default cases consti-
tute a portion of those cases, the skewed caseload is unique to 
the NAF with neither WIPO nor eResolution presenting a simi-
lar caseload imbalance.44   
The NAF is not alone on the issue of caseload allocation bias, 
as WIPO’s track record also raises concerns.  A review of all 
WIPO panelists who have decided five or more single panel 
cases (and thus have a track record) finds that there are 121 
such panelists, all of whom have a complainant win percentage 
that is higher than at least two respondent-friendly WIPO pan-
elists who have never been selected for sole panelist duty.45  In 
fact, all of the 121 panelists have  a complainant winning per-
centage of 50% or better.46 
  
 38. Id. 
    39  Id. 
 40. E-mail from Timothy Cole, Assistant Director of Arbitration, National 
Arbitration Forum, to Michael Geist, Associate Professor of Law, University 
of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (July 19, 2001, 08:29:51 EST) (on file with Journal) 
[hereinafter Cole E-mail]. 
 41. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The six busiest WIPO panelists constitute 17.1% of that provider’s 
single panel caseload; the six busiest eResolution panelists constitute 20.5% 
of that provider’s single panel caseload. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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Following a brief historical review of the development of the 
UDRP and an introduction to its rules in Part II of this Article, 
Part III examines these numbers in greater detail.  The Article 
concludes in Part IV with recommendations for changes to the 
UDRP designed to instill greater fairness and confidence in the 
process.   
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UDRP 
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”), headed 
by the late Jon Postel, initially managed the Domain Name 
System (“DNS”).47  Growing demand from businesses and indi-
viduals, however, together with the increasing administrative 
burden of maintaining the system resulted in changes to the 
system in 1992.48  That year, the United States government 
granted Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”) the exclusive right to 
register three generic top-level domain names (“TLDs”) — 
“.com,” “.net” and “.org.”49  As part of the registration right, 
which was initially scheduled to last five years, NSI was 
charged with managerial responsibility for the maintenance of 
the DNS.50   
With the first agreement set to expire in 1997, the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce (“DOC”) granted NSI a two-year exten-
sion.51  In return, NSI agreed to create a Shared Registry Sys-
tem that would allow competing companies to register “.com,” 
“.org” and “.net” domains.52  Moreover, once a competitive reg-
istrar system was established, NSI agreed to apply for accredi-
tation through the same process as other registrars, thereby 
  
 47. See King, supra note 17, at 459-60. 
 48. See id. at 460. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Kevin Eng, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of 
Trademark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains , 6 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 7 (2000). 
 51. See Courtney Macavinta, Deal Extends NSI Domain Control, CNET 
NEWS.COM (Oct. 6, 1998), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-216367.html; 
Network Solutions, Inc., US Government Extends Network Solutions Coopera-
tive Agreement Through September 2000, at http://corporate.verisign.com/ 
news/1998/pr_19981006.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 52. See Luke A. Walker, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 293-94 (2000). 
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relinquishing its competitive advantage over the domain name 
registry market.53 
NSI did not have a formal dispute resolution mechanism to 
address domain name disputes when it took over the registry 
responsibilities from IANA.54  As disputes began to mount, NSI 
recognized the need for a dispute resolution policy.55  Early ef-
forts, however, became a source of frustration for trademark 
owners and domain name registrants alike since the dispute 
policies focused primarily on protecting NSI from liability.56 
Prior to 1995, NSI maintained that domain name registrants 
bore the responsibility for ensuring that their domain name did 
not infringe upon any trademark rights, but did not otherwise 
provide a formal dispute resolution policy.57  NSI released its 
first formal domain name dispute policy in July 1995.58  It al-
lowed trademark owners to challenge the registration of a do-
main name by presenting NSI with evidence that the domain 
name infringed upon their trademark rights.59  The policy re-
quired the trademark holder to present evidence that their 
trademark was identical to the registered domain name.60  The 
domain name registrant could successfully defend their right to 
the domain by presenting a valid trademark of its own.61  If the 
trademark holder was unable to produce evidence of a regis-
tered trademark, NSI would allow the domain name registrant 
to retain the domain for ninety days as part of a transition 
process.62  If the domain name registrant refused to accept an 
alternative domain, NSI would place the domain “on hold” so 
that neither party could use it.63 
  
 53. Id. at 294. 
 54. Id. at 295. 
 55. See Eng, supra note 50, at 8. 
 56. Id. at 8-9. 
 57. See Walker, supra note 52, at 295. 
 58. See NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
STATEMENT (July 1995). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id.  
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NSI issued its first amendment to the policy in November 
1995.64  The revised policy addressed situations where the do-
main name registration pre-dated the issuance of a trade-
mark.65  In those situations, the domain name registrant was 
entitled to keep the domain, provided that it agreed to post a 
bond to indemnify NSI from any liability.66 
NSI revised its dispute resolution policy yet again in Sep-
tember 1996.67  The new policy required trademark owners to 
notify domain name registrants of their legal claim before 
commencing a dispute resolution action.68  Moreover, the policy 
established limitations on the domain name registrants’ de-
fense of a competing trademark by requiring that the trade-
mark be issued prior to the commencement of the dispute reso-
lution action.69  This latter change was needed after domain 
name registrants began obtaining quick trademark registra-
tions from Tunisia.70 
NSI revised its dispute resolution policy for the final time in 
February 1998.71  That revision allowed trademark owners to 
immediately place domain names “on hold” pending the resolu-
tion of the dispute.72  The domain name registrant, if chal-
lenged, could prevent the domain name from being placed on 
hold by submitting evidence which established that the domain 
name was registered before the complainant’s trademark or the 
domain name holder owned a competing trademark in the do-
main name.73  
Predictably, neither domain name registrants nor trademark 
holders were satisfied with the NSI policies.  Domain name 
registrants argued that the policy was too broad, placing them 
  
 64. See NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
STATEMENT (Nov. 1995). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id.  
 67. See NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
STATEMENT (1996). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id.  
 70. See G. Peter Albert, Eminent Domain Names: The Struggle to Gain 
Control of the Internet Domain Name System, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 781, 790 (1998). 
 71. See NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC., DOMAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
STATEMENT (1998). 
 72. Walker, supra note 52, at 295. 
 73. Id. 
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at a disadvantage because trademark owners could invoke the 
dispute resolution policy and place a domain name on hold, 
even if the domain name registration was for products or ser-
vices bearing no similarity to the trademark use.74   Trademark 
owners, meanwhile, found the policy lacking because it could 
only be invoked where a domain name was identical to a regis-
tered trademark and because placing the domain on hold was 
not an effective remedy where a domain name transfer was 
desired.75 
As the number of domain name lawsuits mushroomed and 
concerns over the stability of the DNS increased, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”), 
an agency of the DOC, issued a draft discussion paper in Feb-
ruary 1998, titled Improvement of Technical Management of 
Internet Names and Addresses (“Green Paper”).76  The Green 
Paper’s stated goals were privatization and international par-
ticipation in the DNS as well as increased competition in regis-
try services.77  Following the Green Paper consultation, the 
NTIA published a final report, the Management of Internet 
Names and Addresses (“White Paper”) in June 1998.78 A key 
concern expressed during the Green Paper public consultations 
was the fear that the U.S. would seek to impose U.S. trade-
mark law on the Internet for the resolution of domain name 
disputes.79  
In an attempt to alleviate this concern, the White Paper 
committed to a WIPO-led international process to develop rec-
ommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark 
and domain name disputes.80  A balanced process that included 
both trademark holders and members of the Internet commu-
nity was envisioned.  The White Paper was also careful to es-
tablish limitations on the new dispute resolution mechanism by 
specifying that it was only to address cybersquatting and/or 
  
 74. Id. at 296. 
 75. Id.   
 76. Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Ad-
dresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. 23). 
 77. Id. at 8826. 
 78. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 
(June 10, 1998). 
 79. See id. at 31,746-47. 
 80. See id. at 31,747. 
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cyberpiracy disputes.81  Other domain name disputes, such as 
competing trademark interests, were left to be settled by the 
courts.82   
Pursuant to the White Paper recommendation, the U.S. gov-
ernment approved the creation of ICANN, granting the new 
non-profit corporation the responsibility for centralizing the 
management of the DNS.83  Meanwhile, in consultation with 
WIPO, the beginning of a new dispute resolution policy began 
to emerge.  WIPO published its first Request for Comments 
(“RFC-1”) in July 1998,84 followed soon after by two further Re-
quests (“RFC-2”85 and “RFC-3”86) calling for public consulta-
tion.  Public comments raised numerous criticisms, including: 
(1) the perception that the proposed policy was unfairly biased 
in favor of trademark holders; (2) the policy’s broad scope; (3) 
the mandatory nature of the dispute resolution proceedings; (4) 
the policy’s impact on freedom of expression; (5) the expense of 
the process; (6) the impact of the proceedings on subsequent 
litigation; (7) choice of law issues; (8) treatment of famous 
marks; (9) procedural concerns; and (10) the possibility that 
future technological change might render the proposed policy 
obsolete.87  WIPO released its final report, The Management of 
Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues 
(“Final Report”) in April 1999, addressing some, though not all, 
of the concerns.88  
Using the WIPO Final Report and the White Paper as its 
guide, ICANN moved quickly to draft a policy to address cyber-
  
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 31,749. 
 84. WIPO, WIPO RFC-1: Request for Comments on Terms of Reference, 
Procedures and Timetable for the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at 
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/1/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 85. WIPO, WIPO RFC-2: Request for Comments on Issues Addressed in the 
Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at 
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/2/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 86. WIPO, Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, at 
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/3/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 87. See WIPO, First WIPO Process-Request for Comments, at 
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/rfc/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 88. See WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES (1999), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/ 
process1/report/doc/report.doc. For a summary of the recommendations found 
in the Final Report, see King, supra note 17, at 464-67. 
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squatting and related issues.89  Only months after the comple-
tion of the WIPO consultation, the ICANN board of directors 
approved the UDRP and its accompanying rules on October 24, 
1999.90  The UDRP differs from the NSI dispute resolution pol-
icy in three material respects: (1) trademark owners are no 
longer able to place a hold on domain names during the dis-
pute-resolution process; (2) trademark owners can only invoke 
a UDRP proceeding if the domain name was registered and is 
being used in bad faith; and (3) the administrative dispute 
resolution proceeding is mandatory for all domain name regis-
trants.91  
Registrants are required to submit to a mandatory adminis-
trative proceeding conducted by a dispute resolution service 
provider, approved by ICANN, where a complainant asserts 
that:  
(1) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a 
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has 
rights;  
(2) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in re-
spect to the domain name; and  
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in 
bad faith.92   
To succeed, the complainant must prove that all three elements 
are present.93  The policy also provides some guidance as to 
what constitutes evidence of bad faith registration and use of a 
domain name.94   They include:  
(1) circumstances indicating that the registrant has acquired 
the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting 
or otherwise transferring it to the complainant who is the 
owner of the trademark or service mark, or to a competitor of 
the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of “out-of-
pocket” costs directly related to the domain name;95   
  
 89. See King, supra note 17, at 468. 
 90. See ICANN, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
Minutes of Meeting, Board Resolution 99.81, at 
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-26aug99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999). 
 91. See Walker, supra note 52, at 299-300. 
 92. See ICANN POLICY § 4(a)(i)-(iii). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. § 4(b). 
 95. Id. § (i). 
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(2) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to 
prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from re-
flecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided 
that a pattern of such conduct is evidenced;96  
(3) the domain name has been registered primarily for the 
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor;97 or  
(4) the domain name has been registered primarily for com-
mercial gain through creating a likelihood of confusion.98 
A respondent can demonstrate rights or a legitimate interest 
in a domain name by presenting evidence that:  
(1) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the re-
spondent used or prepared to use, the domain name or a name 
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona 
fide offering of goods or services;  
(2) the respondent has been commonly known by the domain 
name, even if no trademark or service mark rights have been 
acquired; and  
(3) legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain 
name, without intent to divert consumers or tarnish the 
trademark or service mark for commercial gain, is being 
made.99 
A proceeding commences when the complainant submits a 
complaint to an ICANN approved dispute resolution service 
provider of its choosing.  The complainant must specify 
whether the dispute is to be decided by a single-member or 
three-member panel.100 The fee for a single-member panel is 
paid entirely by the complainant.101    In the event that a three-
member panel is requested, the complainant must submit 
names and contacts of three candidates from a roster of any 
ICANN-approved provider to serve as one of the panelists.102  
Following a compliance review, the provider forwards the com-
plaint to the respondent.103 The respondent must submit a re-
sponse to the provider within twenty days of commencement of 
  
 96. Id. § 4(b)(ii). 
 97. Id. § 4(b)(iii). 
 98. ICANN POLICY § 4(b)(iv). 
 99. Id. § 4(c)(i)-(iii). 
 100. See ICANN RULES § 3(b)(iv). 
 101. Id. § 6(b). 
 102. Id. § 4(b)(iv). 
 103. Id. § 4(a). 
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the proceeding.104  If no response is submitted, the panel de-
cides the case based solely upon the evidence furnished by the 
complainant.105   
Even if the complainant has requested a single-member 
panel, the respondent has the right to have the dispute decided 
by a three-member panel instead.106  If either the complainant 
or respondent requests a three-member panel, the respondent 
must provide the names and contact details of three candidates 
to serve as one of the panelists, which can also be drawn from 
any ICANN-approved provider’s roster.107  Where the com-
plainant has elected to have the dispute decided by a single-
member panel and the respondent requests a three-member 
panel, the respondent is required to pay one-half of the appli-
cable fee for a three-member panel.108   
If the complainant requests a single-member panel and the 
respondent does not object, the provider alone assigns a single 
panelist from its roster to the case.109  If a three-member panel 
is selected, one panelist each is selected from the list of candi-
dates provided by both the complainant and the respondent.110   
The third panelist is appointed by the provider from a list of 
five candidates submitted by the provider to the parties, the 
selection from among the five being “made in a manner that 
reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties.”111   The 
typical approach is to allow each party to strike out up to two 
names from the list of five.112  ICANN policy provides that pan-
elists should be “impartial and independent” and must disclose 
any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubt as to 
the panelist’s impartiality or independence.113  Parties must be 
treated with equality by the panel, with each party accorded a 
fair opportunity to present its case.114   
  
 104. Id. § 5(a). 
 105. Id. § 5(e). 
 106. See ICANN RULES § 5(b)(iv). 
 107. Id. § 5(b)(v). 
 108. Id. § 5(c). 
 109. Id. § 6(b). 
 110. Id. § 6(e). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Cole E-mail, supra note 40. 
 113. See ICANN RULES § 7. 
 114. Id. § 10(b). 
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III. THE STUDY 
A. Methodology and Basic Findings 
The study was initially designed to analyze all UDRP deci-
sions through early July 2001, though it was updated prior to 
publication to include all UDRP decisions as of February 18, 
2002.  It commenced in early May 2001 with a case-by-case re-
view of each decision.  Each case was reviewed for contested 
domain name, proceeding number, panelist, arbitration pro-
vider, commencement date, panel type (single or three-member 
panel) and outcome.  Since the current search functionality 
supported by ICANN and the arbitration providers is limited to 
identifying particular cases, the data was culled directly from 
the cases themselves, which are posted on each provider’s web-
site.115  In the update to the study, the author re-examined all 
cases to verify the accuracy of the initial data, collected infor-
mation related to contested and uncontested cases, as well as 
added all new decisions since July 2001. 
The data was initially entered into a Microsoft Excel spread-
sheet, grouped by panelist and later transferred onto a web-
based database.  Data analysis was conducted on a range of 
issues including overall provider and panelist outcomes, single 
versus three-member panel outcomes, panelist caseload, multi-
provider panelist outcomes and data on panelists serving only 
on three-member panels.  
Basic information on the initial round of collected data in-
cluded: 
· Four thousand three hundred and thirty-two cases were 
examined, of which 2565 were WIPO cases, 1493 were NAF 
cases, 244 were eResolution cases and thirty-one were CPR 
cases.116 
  
 115. See WIPO, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cases/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2002); National Arbitration Forum, at 
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); 
eResolution, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 116. Michael Geist, Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet (2001) (unpublished re-
search data, on file with Journal) [hereinafter Geist-Spreadsheet]. 
 4/20/02 2:42:15 PM 
922 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
· Three thousand eight hundred and eighty-one (89.6%) of 
the cases were single panel cases; 417 (9.6%) featured three-
member panels.117 
· Thirty-one panelists participated exclusively in three-
member panels.  These panelists were involved in ninety-eight 
cases.118 
B. Key Findings 
1. The Dramatic Effect of Three-Member Panels 
Although little attention was accorded to the possible differ-
ences between single and three-member panels during the pub-
lic discussion of the UDRP, by far the most important finding of 
this study is the dramatic difference in case outcomes in single 
versus three-member panel cases.  Single panel cases consti-
tute just over 90% of the total UDRP caseload, while three-
member panels comprise the remaining 10%, with 417 such 
cases decided as of February 18, 2002.119  Across all providers, 
complainants win 83% of the time where only a single panelist 
determines the outcome, compared with 58% when a three-
member panel is responsible for the decision.120  
Three-member panel complainant win percentages remain 
roughly consistent across all providers.  The NAF has the larg-
est differential (37.4%) between single and three-member pan-
els; complainants win 86% of the time in single-member panel 
cases but only 48.6% of the time in three-member panel 
cases.121  The WIPO differential is somewhat smaller at 20.8% 
(complainant single-member panel win percentage of 82.9%; 
three-member panel win percentage of 62.1%), while eResolu-
tion, unsurprisingly, has the smallest differential of 11.8% 
(complainant single-member panel win percentage of 61.8%; 
three-member panel win percentage of 50%).122  
One might expect that the difference between a single and 
three-member panel is attributable to substantively stronger 
respondent cases in three-member panel cases.  That theory 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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would posit that respondents are willing to incur the additional 
expense involved in a three-member panel in order to protect 
their domain name when they have a particularly strong ar-
gument.  Moreover, unlike single-member panel cases, where 
respondents sometimes fail to submit a response and thus fur-
ther decrease their chances of retaining their domain name, 
one might expect that three-member panel cases would rarely 
involve a non-response or “default.”123 
The data conclusively finds otherwise, however.  Contrary to 
expectations, complainants actually request three-member 
panels more frequently than do respondents.  Although the 
data is somewhat incomplete since some decisions do not dis-
close which party requested the three-member panel, the au-
thor was able to ascertain this information for 238 of the 292 
three-member panel cases as of July 7, 2001.124  In that sample, 
complainants requested the three-member panel 62% of the 
time (148 of 238 cases).125 
Furthermore, three-member panel cases actually do include 
a significant number of defaults.  Of the 417 three-member 
panel cases as of February 18, 2002, the respondent failed to 
provide a response 24.5% of the time (102 of 417).126  Com-
plainants won all but one of those cases.127  In fact, when de-
fault cases are excluded from the three-member panel case out-
comes, complainants win only 46% of the time.128   
Interestingly, differences between single and three-member 
panels remain very consistent for both contested and uncon-
tested cases.  When the sample size is limited solely to con-
tested (non-default) cases, complainants win 68% of the time 
(1109 of 1639) in single panel cases, but only 46% of the time 
  
 123. In fact, the NAF Supplemental Rules explicitly encourage avoiding 
three-member panel default cases by providing complainants with the option 
of switching to a single panelist where the respondent fails to submit a re-
sponse.  The NAF provides the complainant with a refund of the difference in 
panel cost.  See NAF RULES § 9(c).  
 124. Geist-Spreadsheet, supra note 116.  Data was obtained from the cases 
where available.  Where unavailable, panelists were asked directly if they 
could recall which party requested the three-member panel.  The author 
thanks the many panelists who responded to the request. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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(forty-five of 314) in three-member panel cases, a 22% differen-
tial that compares quite favorably to the 25% differential when 
all cases are considered.129  In fact, the differential between 
providers remains the same as well with complainants winning 
70% and 69% of the time in single-member panel cases with 
WIPO (636 of 914) and NAF (400 of 579) respectively, but only 
50% of the time with eResolution (sixty-five of 131).130  The 
three-member panel outcomes by provider show complainants 
winning 48% of contested cases with WIPO (ninety-eight of 
203), 42% with NAF (thirty-nine of ninety-three), and 47% with 
eResolution (seven of fifteen).131  
This data points to two conclusions.  First, the inclusion of 
uncontested cases is largely immaterial in determining pro-
vider differences in complainant win percentages (19 to 22% 
difference between WIPO/NAF and eResolution when all cases 
are included; 19 to 20% difference between WIPO/NAF and 
eResolution for non-default cases only).  Second, the inclusion 
of defaults does not affect the difference in complainant win 
percentage when comparing single and three-member panels 
(23% difference for all cases; 22% difference for non-default 
cases).   
This data begs several questions.  First, if strength of re-
spondent case and uncontested cases are not the reason behind 
the single versus three-member panel outcome differential, 
why the dramatic difference?  Second, what motivates com-
plainants to select the three-member panel option, when the 
data suggests that single-member panels rule overwhelmingly 
in their favor? 
A partial answer to both questions may well be the number 
of inconsistent, wrongly decided and poorly reasoned UDRP 
decisions.  While every adjudicative system will have its share 
of bad decisions, the UDRP has come under heavy criticism for 
inconsistent decisions,132 decisions lacking virtually any rea-
  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Compare, e.g., Guerlain S.A. v. HI Investments, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0494 (2000) (Glas, Arb.), available at 
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0494.html 
(dispute over the buyguerlain.com domain), with Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. 
William H. Wilson, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. 
D2000-0265 (2000), (Introvigne, Arb.), available at 
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soning133 and decisions that have clearly misinterpreted the 
UDRP.134  Inconsistent and poorly reasoned decisions diminish 
both respondent and complainant confidence in the system.  
Respondents are concerned by the over 80% complainant suc-
cess rate and may see the entire system as unfair.  Complain-
ants, while unquestionably pleased with an over 80% likelihood 
of winning, may still be unhappy, particularly if they have a 
strong case since they may fear that the single panelist as-
signed to their case may be the one that misinterprets the pol-
icy.  The UDRP is therefore perceived by some complainants to 
be a gamble with very good odds.  While that may be fine for 
some complainants, for those with cases that they believe are 
unquestionably instances of bad faith cybersquatting, it may be 
a gamble they are unwilling to take.   Both respondents and 
complainants therefore turn to the three-member panel as a 
method of hedging against bias and bad decisions.  
At least three factors contribute to the greater confidence in 
the three-member panel.  First, this panel configuration elimi-
nates the possibility that a single panelist may simply misin-
terpret the UDRP and render the wrong decision.  Second, the 
three-member panel forces panelists to more carefully consider 
their decisions by justifying it before their counterparts on the 
panel.  For example, at least one well-known panelist, who has 
participated in several three-member panel cases, advised the 
  
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0265.html.  
Although WIPO panelists decided both cases with similar facts, the outcomes 
were markedly different as buyguerlain.com was transferred to the com-
plainant, while the registrant retained the rights to buyvuarnetsun-
glasses.com. 
 133. See, e.g., Rockport Boat Line, Ltd. v. Gananoque Boat Line, Ltd., Na-
tional Arbitration Forum, Forum File No. FA0004000094653 (2000) (Karem, 
Arb.), available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/94653.htm 
(dispute over the rockportboatline.com domain).  Rockport brought the action 
against Gananoque Boat Line, the domain name registrant and its competi-
tor across the river.  In a peculiar decision, not only did the panelist rule in 
favor of the registrant and refuse to transfer the domain, but did so without 
providing much analytical reasoning.  See id. 
 134. See, e.g., Reg Vardy Plc v. David Wilkinson, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, Case No. D2001-0593 (2001) (Thorne, Arb.), available at 
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0593.html  
(dispute over the reg-vardy.com domain). The WIPO panelist openly admitted 
that the case did not meet with the requirements needed for transfer, yet 
proceeded to transfer to the domain notwithstanding that admission.  See id.  
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author that he successfully persuaded his fellow panelists to 
change their votes on more than one occasion.   
Third, and most importantly, the three-member panel com-
pletely alters the panelist selection process.  In a single-
member panel case, the arbitration provider is exclusively re-
sponsible for allocating the case to a panelist.135  Conversely, in 
a three-member panel case, the arbitration provider wields 
comparatively little influence over the selection process.  Both 
the complainant and respondent are typically allowed to select 
one of the three panel members by submitting a list of three or 
five acceptable candidates from which the provider will select 
one.136  The provider selects the third member of the panel, but 
only after it has provided both the complainant and respondent 
with the opportunity to indicate which panelist it prefers.137 
Furthermore, the roster of available panelists changes dra-
matically in a three-member panel.  Unlike a single-member 
panel case, in which the provider selects a single panelist from 
amongst its roster, the complainant and respondent are under 
no such limitation in a three-member panel case.  In those 
cases, the ICANN Rules allow parties to nominate any panelist 
from any ICANN-accredited provider’s roster.138  This rule 
more than doubles the number of available panelists and en-
sures that both parties can seek out panelists they view as fa-
vorable to their case without regard to the provider. 
Although the benefit of broadening the panelist field was ap-
parent to many, the importance of removing much of the pro-
vider’s responsibility for case allocation was less apparent since 
all providers maintain that case allocation occurs on a random 
basis.  If that were the case, panelist selection would not be a 
matter for concern.  A close examination of the data suggests, 
however, that single panelist selection may be anything but 
random. 
2. Suggestions of Bias Within UDRP Caseload Allocation 
As noted above, the UDRP Rules refer only briefly to the is-
sue of single-member panel selection.  Article 6(b) specifies that 
  
 135. See ICANN RULES § 6(b). 
 136. Id. § 6(e). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. § 6(d). 
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providers shall select a panelist from their roster with the cost 
to be paid entirely by the complainant.139  The providers’ sup-
plemental rules similarly include scant information on the is-
sue, with most focused on the three-member panel selection 
process.140  Neither WIPO nor the NAF provide any additional 
rules on single panelist selections.  Alone among the three ma-
jor providers, the eResolution Supplemental Rules provide that 
“[w]hen appointing a Panelist, the Clerk’s office shall take into 
account the Panelist’s nationality, place of residence and any 
links he or she may have with the Parties’ countries of ori-
gin.”141  In correspondence with the author, an eResolution rep-
resentative confirmed that where the complainant and respon-
dent reside in different jurisdictions, eResolution endeavors to 
assign a panelist from a neutral third country.142 
Examining information that can be easily extracted from 
UDRP case search facilities maintained by ICANN and the 
providers are also of little help in shedding light into panelist 
allocation.  The current search functionality is very limited, 
with the database searchable primarily by case name.  More-
over, culling information directly from the cases is time-
consuming since UDRP decisions are not consistently reported. 
The lack of transparency on issues such as panelist allocation 
is particularly worrisome since the data suggests that there is 
a significant difference in outcome when panelists are allocated 
exclusively by the provider in a single-member panelist case 
and when both parties influence the composition of the panel, 
  
 139. Id. § 6(b). 
 140. See NAF RULES § 9; ERESOLUTION RULES ¶ 8; WIPO,  at 
www.wipo.int/index.html.en (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 141. ERESOLUTION RULES § 8(i). 
 142. E-mail from Joëlle Thibault, Vice President, Professional Services, 
eResolution, to Michael Geist, Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, 
Faculty of Law (Aug. 1, 2001, 09:19:08 EST) (on file with Journal) [hereinaf-
ter Thibault E-mail].  A review of eResolution’s case allocation confirms that 
this is the typical practice.  Through July 7, 2001, there were sixty eResolu-
tion single panel cases involving parties from different jurisdictions.  In fifty-
five of those cases, the single panelist was a resident of neither the complain-
ant’s nor the respondent’s jurisdiction.  Although not explicitly provided in its 
rules, it would appear that a similar policy is followed by WIPO.  A review of 
its caseload of single-member panel cases involving parties from different 
jurisdictions yielded 784 cases, of which 736 involved a single panelist who 
was not a resident of either the complainant’s or the respondent’s jurisdic-
tion. 
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as in a three-member panelist case.143  Furthermore, with a 
growing number of panelists cross-listed on two or more pro-
vider rosters, differences in outcomes between providers cannot 
be easily attributed to the different composition of the provider 
rosters.   
A review of the 3881 single-member panel cases as of Febru-
ary 18, 2002 indicates that single panel cases may not be allo-
cated in an entirely random manner.144  Most disturbing are 
the case allocation trends at the NAF.  Of the NAF’s 1379 sin-
gle-member panel cases, only six panelists decided an astonish-
ing 56.4% (778 of 1379) of the cases.145  The sheer number of 
cases assigned to only six people alone is surprising.  The 778 
cases represent 20% of the entire UDRP single panelist 
caseload.146   
The NAF caseload allocation data is particularly noteworthy 
since it stands in stark contrast to the other providers, whose 
numbers are nearly identical.  The six busiest single-member 
panelists at WIPO account for 17.1% of the WIPO single panel-
ist caseload, while the six busiest single panel panelists at 
eResolution account for 20.5% of their total caseload.147  Al-
though WIPO’s overall caseload is considerably larger than the 
NAF’s, the raw numbers still indicate a significant difference.  
The 17.1% caseload at WIPO represents a total of 385 cases, 
just under half of the NAF total of 778.148   
More troubling than the NAF caseload data alone is the fact 
that complainants have won 95.1% of those cases.149  This fig-
ure is remarkably higher than virtually any other point of 
comparison, including overall complainant winning percentage 
or complainant winning percentage by provider.  Moreover, 
when contrasted with 46% complainant win rate in NAF three-
member panel cases, the impact of provider panelist selection 
becomes glaringly apparent. 
  
 143. Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. The six panelists, in order of caseload, are: James A. Carmody, 
Carolyn Marks Johnson, James P. Buchele, Ralph Yachnin, Harold Kalina 
and John J. Upchurch.  Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Geist-Database, supra note 30. With its smaller caseload, the compa-
rable eResolution total is only forty-seven cases. 
 149. Id.  
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The large number of default cases decided by NAF’s six busi-
est panelists might admittedly be partially responsible for 
skewing the complainant win percentage upward. Default 
cases, do not, however, explain the failure to randomly allocate 
caseload because the vast majority of the NAF panelists hear 
default cases.  Since the majority of the NAF panelists are will-
ing to decide default cases, random case allocation would sug-
gest that the caseloads should be distributed more evenly.  
Moreover, the default track records of some of NAF’s busiest 
panelists might lead observers to conclude that the ICANN 
UDRP has reversed the traditional maxim of innocent until 
proven guilty.  The Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson, James 
P. Buchele and Harold Kalina have never ruled in favor of a 
respondent in a default case, with complainants winning 324 of 
324 cases between the three panelists.150  Not far behind sit 
Ralph Yachnin and John J. Upchurch, who have a combined 
complainant win record in default cases of 184 in 187 cases.151 
The NAF caseload data is not the only example of UDRP 
panel selection bias.  A second source of data is a review of 
which panelists have never been selected for single panel duty.  
There are thirty-one such panelists, who have participated in 
at least one UDRP case, but never as a single panelist.152  
Nearly 60% of the panelists (eighteen of thirty-one) have only 
participated in one UDRP case and therefore have no track re-
cord.153  WIPO’s panelist roster contains two panelists who 
stand out, however.   
G. Gervaise Davis III, a California attorney, and Professor 
Milton Mueller of Syracuse University, the author of the UDRP 
study, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN’s Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy,154 have together participated in a total of forty 
cases, yet neither has ever participated as a sole panelist.155  
That Davis and Mueller would be popular among respondents 
seeking a panelist for a three-member panel comes as little 
  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. MUELLER, supra note 8. 
 155. Professor A. Michael Froomkin, a well-known ICANN critic, has also 
participated in twelve UDRP cases, though never as a single panelist.  Pro-
fessor Froomkin was featured on the eResolution panelist roster.  
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surprise.  The complainant has won only nine of the twenty-
four cases in which Davis has appeared as a panelist.156  Simi-
larly, the complainant has won only four of the sixteen cases in 
which Mueller has appeared as a panelist.157   
Given their records, it seems unlikely that a complainant 
would select either panelist if given a choice.  Assuming ran-
dom caseload allocation, however, it also seems unlikely that 
among the 2565 WIPO single panel cases, neither Davis nor 
Mueller’s name would surface even once.  In fact, a review of 
all WIPO panelists that have decided five or more single-
member panel cases (and thus have a track record) provides 
further evidence that this omission is not mere happenstance.  
There have been 121 panelists selected by WIPO five or more 
times to decide single-member panel cases — all 121 panelists 
have a complainant win percentage that is higher than that of 
Davis or Mueller and that is at least 50%.158  
IV. UDRP REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Mandatory Three-Member Panels 
Calls for reform to the UDRP have been voiced since its in-
ception.  Concerns regarding forum shopping have cast doubt 
on the fairness of the process.  A plethora of inconsistent and 
clearly incorrect decisions have left both trademark holders 
and domain name registrants alike uncomfortable with the un-
certainty of the process.  Add to these concerns the suggestion 
of provider bias in the determination of who decides what case. 
Professor Mueller raised several possibilities for reform in 
Rough Justice, including random selection of panelists, the de-
velopment of an appellate process and a greater tie between 
provider and registrar.159  Random selection was seen as prob-
lematic since it might eliminate a competitive provider envi-
ronment and leave ICANN with a much larger dispute resolu-
tion regulatory function than is presently the case.160  Although 
the appellate process might reduce the number of bad deci-
sions, Mueller points out that it is also likely to delay the reso-
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 158. Id. 
 159. See MUELLER, supra note 8, at pt. 4. 
 160. See id. 
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lution of domain name disputes and render the process more 
like global law than a form of alternative dispute resolution.161 
Professor Mueller ultimately favored a registrar selection 
process, in which registrars would contract with one or more 
accredited dispute resolution providers to handle all the dis-
putes raised by their registrations.162  Under this system, the 
complainant would no longer select the provider, yet a competi-
tive provider system would remain in place.163 Alternative sug-
gestions have included a new ICANN accreditation scheme 
that would accredit panelists rather than providers,164 the use 
of juries to resolve disputes165 and respondent selection of pro-
vider.166 
This Article suggests that although each of these proposals 
for reform may have a positive effect on the problematic as-
pects of the UDRP, they ultimately will not address the root of 
the problem.  Rather than focusing on provider selection as a 
means of solving the forum shopping issue, ICANN must turn 
its attention to panelist selection.  If providers continue to 
maintain exclusive and unchecked authority over the selection 
of panelists in 90% of all UDRP cases, no reforms to the rules 
or how a provider is selected will remove the potential for bias 
in panelist allocation.  The author submits that the solution to 
the forum shopping issue, and with it the concerns about bias 
and inconsistency within the UDRP, is surprisingly simple — 
all contested UDRP actions should involve three-member pan-
els.  Establishing the three-member panel as the default would 
remove most provider influence over panelist selection and en-
sure better quality decisions by forcing panelists to justify their 
reasoning to their colleagues on the panel.  As with the current 
system, both parties would play a role in selecting one panelist, 
who may be part of any ICANN-accredited provider’s roster, 
  
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See John Berryhill, The UDRP Provides Disputable Resolution Incen-
tives, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/udrp_and_incentives.htm (Apr. 4, 
2000). 
 165. See D. G. Post, Juries and the UDRP, at http://www.icannwatch.org/ 
archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm (Sept. 6, 2000). 
 166. See Rose Communications, S.L., Domain Name Dispute Procedure and 
Related Issues, at http://www.rose.es/udrpenglish.htm (May 2001). 
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while the provider would select the third panelist from among a 
list that both parties have reviewed and accepted.   
The dramatic difference in single versus three-member panel 
outcomes should not be viewed as shifting the balance toward 
domain name registrants, but rather as shifting the balance 
toward greater fairness.  Although analysts have argued over 
what the right complainant win percentage ought to be, the 
60% complainant win rate in three-member panels indicates 
that the best considered decisions place the percentage much 
lower than the current overall rate of 82%.167  
Unlike the current system, the complainant would be re-
quired to cover the full cost of the three-member panel.  Al-
though this requirement will double the cost of a UDRP action 
for many complainants, the cost will remain low in comparison 
with traditional litigation.  Moreover, the fact that complain-
ants already select a three-member panel more frequently than 
do respondents indicates that concern over the quality of deci-
sions is currently an issue for both trademark holders and do-
main name registrants.  Provider caseloads also indicate that 
complainants are relatively cost-insensitive since WIPO, the 
most expensive of the three main providers, enjoys a command-
ing 59% share of all UDRP cases.168 
One further method of reducing complainant costs would be 
to combine the mandatory three-member panel rule for con-
tested cases with the NAF Supplemental Rule on respondent 
defaults.169  That rule allows a complainant to move from a 
three-member panel to a single panelist where the respondent 
fails to provide a response.170  In doing so, the complainant is 
refunded the difference in cost between a single-member and 
three-member panel.171  Adopting that supplemental rule 
would allow complainants to reduce their costs during default 
cases, while maintaining the benefits of three-member panels 
for contested cases. 
Forcing complainants to shoulder the full cost of a three-
member panel should not be regarded as providing respondents 
with a free ride.  The costs inherent in launching or defending 
  
 167. See Geist-Database, supra note 30. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See NAF RULES  § 9(c). 
 170. Id. § (i). 
 171. Id. § 9(c)(iv). 
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a UDRP action extend well beyond the provider fees.  Legal 
and administrative costs can be several times as much as the 
provider fee, and the current rules do not contain any provision 
for costs.  Accordingly, defending a UDRP action remains an 
expensive proposition for all registrants, even if the require-
ment to contribute to the cost of a three-member panel is 
eliminated. 
Interestingly, this approach has met with approval at the 
country code TLD level.  In November 2001, the Canadian 
Internet Registration Authority (“CIRA”), which administers 
the “.ca” domain, approved the Canadian Domain Name Reso-
lution Policy (“CDRP”).172  Although the CDRP is modeled after 
the ICANN UDRP, it differs in several material respects.  Most 
important for the current purposes, the CIRA Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Rules, which govern the CDRP, provide that 
all contested cases will be decided by three-member panels to 
be paid for by the complainant.173  Where the respondent fails 
to respond, the complainant has the option of requesting a less 
costly one-person panel.174 
B. Caseload Minimums and Maximums 
Several additional smaller reforms may prove effective in 
conjunction with the adoption of the three-member panel as the 
standard approach.  The establishment of caseload minimums 
and maximums would help ensure that this study’s findings — 
huge caseloads assigned to a small number of panelists as well 
as the failure to select some panelists for dispute resolution 
duty — are eliminated. 
If all contested UDRP cases featured three-member panels, 
chosen, by and large, by the complainant and respondent, pro-
viders would be unable to ensure that panelists met either 
caseload minimums or maximums.  However, providers will 
still play a role in naming the panel’s third panelist as well as 
in respondent default cases that revert to a single panelist.  
  
 172. See CIRA, at http://www.cira.ca/en/home.html (last visited Apr. 20, 
2002).  In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author is 
an elected member of CIRA’s board of directors. 
 173. CIRA, CIRA DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES ¶ 6.4 (2001), 
available at http://www.cira.ca/officialdoc/96.rules_final_November_29_2001 
_en.pdf. 
 174. Id. ¶ 6.5. 
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Accordingly, it would be beneficial to create new limits that 
ensure that all panelists are afforded the opportunity to pre-
side over a roughly equivalent number of cases and that no 
panelist gets too many cases.  The minimum cases would likely 
be expressed by a raw number, perhaps no less than three 
cases per year.  The maximum caseload would likely be ex-
pressed as a percentage, perhaps no more than 3% of a pro-
vider’s total caseload.  Establishing these caseload minimums 
and maximums would reduce provider influence over panelist 
selection, increase the assurance of random case allocation and 
enhance the public perception of the UDRP’s fairness.   
C. New Quality Control Mechanisms 
Although eResolution did not publicize the fact on its web-
site, it engaged in an annual quality control review of its panel-
ists.175  In 2000, ten panelists were removed from its roster due 
to quality control problems such as unreasonable delays in the 
release of decisions or failures to abide by the ICANN Rules.176 
Similar quality control mechanisms should become standard at 
all ICANN-accredited providers.  Complainants and respon-
dents alike will agree that the quality of individual panelists 
varies greatly.  While this is not unexpected, all providers 
should play an active role in seeking to ensure that only the 
best panelists participate in the UDRP.  The annual reviews 
should be conducted in public, with solicitations of comments 
from the public and the public release of those persons removed 
from each provider’s roster.  
D. Greater Transparency 
One of the greatest challenges in conducting this study was 
the lack of readily available data.  Although all UDRP cases 
are posted and freely available, case reports vary in quality 
since there is no standard approach.  Moreover, the current 
search functionality on both the ICANN and provider sites lack 
the functionality necessary to search by panelist and panel 
type — two critical considerations.  As a result of this short-
coming, the author intends to post the data collected during 
  
 175. See Thibault E-mail, supra note 142. 
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this study on a publicly available website.177  In addition, the 
UDRP Publishing Protocol Project, hosted by Cornell Law 
School, plans to support the development of greater reporting 
standards.178  ICANN, in conjunction with the providers, 
should make the availability of greater and more useful UDRP 
data a priority.  Increased transparency in the entire process, 
from panelist selection to decision-making process, will only 
enhance public confidence in the system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Domain Name Supporting Organization Names Council 
engaged in a study of the ICANN UDRP, though the future of 
that study was in doubt as of April 2002, due to an initiative to 
reform ICANN’s governance structure.179  Part II of this Arti-
cle, which reviewed the development of a domain name dispute 
resolution policy dating back to the initial NSI policies in the 
mid-1990’s, illustrates that policies have changed with surpris-
ing regularity as practical experience identifies the need for 
reform.180  ICANN must not shy away from reforming the do-
main name dispute resolution policy yet again.   
This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping 
has become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system 
may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders.  Both 
WIPO and the NAF, the two dominant ICANN-accredited arbi-
tration providers, feature case allocation data that suggests 
that the panelist selection process is not random.   Rather, it 
appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of 
cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panelists.  
Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation between 
  
 177. See Geist-Database, supra note 30.   
 178. See Cornell Law School, Index of /udrp, at http://udrp.law.cornell.edu/ 
udrp (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 179. See Domain Name Supporting Organization of ICANN, UDRP Review 
and Evaluation, Terms of Reference, at http://www.dnso.org/dnso/ 
notes/2001.NC-tor-UDRP-Review-Evaluation.v1.html (amended with the NC 
motion voted on Aug. 11, 2001) (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). 
 180. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to 
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 58-59 (2000)  
(“NSI’s control over the mechanics of registration allowed it to, and perhaps 
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The most controversial of these was undoubtedly NSI’s frequently amended 
‘dispute policy.’”). 
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provider panelist selection and case outcome.  When providers 
control who decides a case, as they do for all single panel cases, 
complainants win just over 83% of the time.181  As provider in-
fluence over panelists diminishes, as occurs in three-member 
panel cases, the complainant winning percentage drops to 
60%.182   
The solution to the forum shopping and bias issues may be 
relatively simple — the adoption of the three-member panel as 
the default approach.  When combined with protective meas-
ures such as caseload minimums and maximums, transparent 
quality control mechanisms and greater accountability through 
standardized disclosure, the reforms would succeed in instilling 
greater confidence and fairness in the UDRP. 
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ANNEX A 
 
PANELISTS LISTED WITH MORE THAN ONE PROVIDER 
(As of July 31, 2001) 
PANELIST NAF eRes CPR WIPO 
1.  Bansal, Ashwanie Kumar Yes – – Yes 
2.   Bernstein, David H. Yes – Yes Yes 
3.   Bianchi, Roberto A. Yes – – Yes 
4.   Bridgeman, James Jude Yes Yes – Yes 
5.   Carson, Ross – Yes – Yes 
6.   Chiasson, Edward C. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7.   Christie, Andrew – Yes – Yes 
8.   Creel, Thomas L. – – Yes Yes 
9.   DeCicco, Paul Michael Yes Yes – Yes 
10.   Diaz, Hon. Nelson A. Yes – Yes – 
11.   Doi, Teruo – Yes – Yes 
12.   Donahey, M. Scott Yes Yes Yes Yes 
13.   Elliott, Clive Lincoln Yes – – Yes 
14.   Fashler, Robert A. Yes Yes – Yes 
15.   Gabay, Mayer Yes – – Yes 
16.   Gulliksson, Jonas Yes – – Yes 
17.   Haviland, Dana – Yes – Yes 
18.   Hill, Richard Yes Yes – Yes 
19.   Hudis, Jonathan Yes – – Yes 
20.   Introvigne, Dr. Massimo Yes – – Yes 
21.   Iteanu, Olivier Yes – – Yes 
22.   Jayaram, Hariram Yes – – Yes 
23.   Kaufman, Jeffrey H. Yes – – Yes 
24.   Kim, Young Yes – – Yes 
25.   Knopf, Howard P. – Yes – Yes 
26.   Kyle, Rodney C. Yes Yes – – 
27.   Lametti, David – Yes – Yes 
28.   Le Stanc, Christian Yes – – Yes 
29.   Lee, Moon Sung Yes – – Yes 
30.   Leger, Jacques A. Yes Yes – Yes 
31.   Leonardos, Gabriel Yes Yes – Yes 
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PANELIST NAF eRes CPR WIPO 
   Francisco 
32.   Li, Yong Yes Yes – Yes 
33.   Limbury, Alan Lawrence Yes Yes – Yes 
34.   Lisman, Natasha C. – Yes – Yes 
35.   Lowry, Houston Putnam Yes Yes – – 
36.   Machado, Eduardo 
   Maga lhaes 
Yes – – Yes 
37.   Mason, Paul E. – Yes – Yes 
38.   Methvin, Gaynell C. – – Yes Yes 
39.   Michaelson, Peter L. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
40.   Mille, Antonio – Yes – Yes 
41.   Ophir, Michael Yes – – Yes 
42.   Osborne, Dawn Yes Yes – Yes 
43.   Perritt, Henry – Yes – Yes 
44.   Pimenta, Luiz Edgard 
   Montaury 
Yes – – Yes 
45.   Plant, David – – Yes Yes 
46.   Richard, Hugues G. Yes Yes – Yes 
47.   Samuels, Jeffrey M. Yes – – Yes 
48.   Schanda, Reinhard Yes – – Yes 
49.   Sellers, Sandra A. – Yes Yes – 
50.   Semuyaba, Justine Yes Yes – Yes 
51.   Singh, Maninder Yes – – Yes 
52.   Sol Muntanola, Mario A. Yes – – Yes 
53.   Swinson, John V. – Yes – Yes 
54.   Szamosi, Dr. Katalin Yes – – Yes 
55.   Thompson, Roderick M. – – Yes Yes 
56.   Triana, Fernando Yes – – Yes 
57.   Turner, Jonathan DC – Yes – Yes 
58.   Ulmer, Nicolas Courtland Yes – – Yes 
59.   Upchurch, Hon. John J. Yes – Yes – 
60.   Wallace, Anne M. Yes Yes – – 
61.   Wallberg, Knud Yes – – Yes 
62.   Weinstein, Jordan – Yes – Yes 
63.   Woo, Jisuk – Yes – Yes 
 
